



An Embarrassing Episode in the History of the Law of 
Evidence 
John H. Mansfield∗ 
There may be value in attempting simply to give an account of 
the events that have brought us to the present state of affairs 
regarding the admissibility of expert testimony, a state of affairs that 
may fairly be described as a conceptual muddle containing within it a 
threat to liberty and popular participation in government.  Such an 
account may force out of concealment mistakes that have been made 
and instill the will to remedy them, or at least to limit their damage. 
The first task is to characterize the law that obtained before 
Daubert1 regarding the admissibility of what for convenience we may 
refer to as expert testimony.  It seems permissible to say, if we leave 
aside the complication created by Frye,2 that expert evidence was 
admissible if relevant, meaning by relevant that it would justify a trier 
of fact in altering probabilities on a disputed issue in the light of 
background beliefs that could reasonably be imputed to the trier of 
fact—in the case of a jury, beliefs held by a substantial proportion of 
the population.  This assumes that the evidence did not pose a 
significant risk of any of the undesirable effects we now find 
catalogued in Rule 403.3  Concededly the notion that an expert must 
be qualified provided an opening for a more serious limitation on 
admissibility,4 but in practice this requirement could easily be 
satisfied, usually by the mere recital of formal credentials.  Certainly 
an opinion that an expert might express was not required to have any 
particular probative value.5 
Decisions regarding the admissibility of expert testimony were 
focused not on the probative value of the evidence, nor on whether 
the expert was a real expert in the sense that he was providing correct 
 
 ∗ John H. Watson, Jr. Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. 
 1 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 2 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 3 FED. R. EVID. 403 [hereinafter Rule 403 or 403]. 
 4 See CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 28-29 (1954). 
 5 See id. at 363 (“Any relevant conclusions which are supported by a qualified 
expert witness should be received unless there are other reasons for exclusion.”). 
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information, but on whether the jury should be informed about the 
matter to which the witness proposed to testify through the formal 
process of evidence introduced at trial, or through the informal 
process of jury notice, the jurors simply taking into account what they 
already knew from their own experience.  Thus if the question was 
whether a witness who described himself as an “accidentologist” 
should be allowed to give an opinion about the point of impact 
between two vehicles, the question was not whether his opinion was 
correct, but whether the information he would provide was not 
widely known, and so properly should be presented in open court 
and subjected to adversary testing.6 
In addition to concern with the allocation of information 
between the formal and the informal processes, pre-Daubert decisions 
addressed the question of whether a witness should be allowed to 
testify using broad characterizations, drawing inferences, and 
expressing conclusions, or be confined to specifics, a question we 
associate with the Opinion Rule now embodied in Rule 701.7  
Discussion of this question assumed that the witness’s information 
properly was channeled through the formal process of presenting 
evidence at trial, the only question being the form it should take.  In 
most situations involving what is loosely referred to as expert 
testimony, the information that it was desired to be provided the trier 
of fact could not be effectively communicated unless the witness used 
generalizations, inferences, opinions and so forth.  In the case of 
what we may call for the moment nonexpert witnesses, on the other 
hand, it was often possible to insist that the witness be specific 
without there being any risk of loss of relevant evidence.  The release 
from the constraints of the opinion rule of witnesses who had 
complex information to communicate did not imply, however, that 
these witnesses’ testimony was required to be more than relevant, or 
that because they might be loosely characterized as experts that they 
had to be real experts in the sense of oracles of undoubted truth. 
In all of this pre-Daubert law, there was no suggestion that 
evidence, to be admissible, had to be capable of being understood in 
a particular way by jurors, or that jurors had to be able to follow the 
reasoning of the expert.  All that was required was that the evidence 
be relevant in the sense referred to above.  There was no suggestion 
that evidence, in order to be allowed before the jury, had to carry 
with it a capacity for educating them to a certain level of 
 
 6 See Een v. Consol. Freightways, 120 F. Supp. 289 (D.N.D. 1954), aff’d, 220 F.2d 
82 (8th Cir. 1955). 
 7 FED. R. EVID. 701 [hereinafter Rule 701]. 
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understanding, either that attained by the witness himself or the level 
that might be attained by an intelligent, generally informed judge.  
The decision whether to educate was left to the parties: in a particular 
case, if a party did not provide material that would enable the jurors 
to understand, the verdict might go against him.  What capacity for 
education the jurors would have would be determined by the basic 
requirements for jury service regarding intelligence and background 
information, but whether this capacity would be utilized by the 
evidence actually introduced was not something policed by the rules 
of admissibility. 
Exclusion on the grounds of prejudice, confusion of issues, waste 
of time and so forth—the evils now catalogued in Rule 403—did not 
in any way contradict what has just been said about the easy 
admissibility of expert testimony pre-Daubert.  None of the 403 evils, a 
risk of which justified exclusion unless outweighed by probative value, 
could be posited of expert testimony as such: disregard of the 
substantive law; disregard of the burden of proof; giving way to 
emotion; confusion of issues or misleading the jury, in the sense of 
not being clear about the different questions under the substantive 
law and to which of them evidence might be relevant; waste of time 
because the evidence replicated evidence already presented; or 
cumulativeness.  If there was a substantial risk of the occurrence of 
one or more of these evils, then the probative value of the evidence 
offered had to be considered, but not if all that could be said of the 
evidence was that it was expert evidence. 
It is in Frye that we may espy the roots of our present troubles.  
They are to be found not in the well-known uncertainties as to what is 
the non-official body that must accept the evidence, in what sense 
must the body accept it, and why should the law defer to the opinion 
of a non-official group regarding the probative value of evidence, but 
in the erection of the idea of “scientific evidence” as a legal category 
having consequences for admissibility.  But the damage inflicted by 
Frye was limited, at least in its immediate consequences.  In the first 
place, Frye appeared to be restricted to “novel” scientific evidence, 
which might have exempted evidence of a sort that had been around 
for some time, even though of slight probative value.  Furthermore, 
there was no implication in Frye that its requirement might spread to 
the whole area of expert testimony.  The Frye rule, even as narrowly 
conceived and applied to novel scientific evidence, was not 
universally accepted, and in the years preceding Daubert, there were 
signs of resistance to it.8  It is one of the ironies of our story that this 
 
 8 See Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United 
  
80 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 34:077 
resistance to Frye led to a regime that has turned out to be much 
more restrictive and extensive in its application than Frye itself. 
Next came the enactment of Rule 702.9  There was nothing in 
the text or legislative history of 702 that would justify finding an 
intention to erect a barrier to the admissibility of expert testimony 
higher than the one that already existed.  Of course, there was the 
question of the effect of 702 on cases that fell within the ambit of 
Frye—“novel scientific evidence”—but if account is taken of the 
resistance that had been growing to Frye, a defensible interpretation 
of 702 could have been that it abolished Frye and left the law of 
admissibility of expert testimony much as McCormick suggested it was 
and ought to be.10  In Daubert, the Court did indeed say that 702 
abolished Frye, but then announced another rule governing the 
admissibility of expert testimony, the consequences of which we are 
now experiencing.  In my own view, Rule 702 should have been read 
not to impose this new requirement, but simply to have affirmed the 
distinction, already referred to, between information that should 
come through the formal process and information that should come 
through the informal process of jury notice.  The phrase “qualified as 
an expert,” which does appear in 702, should have been read to 
mean only that the witness had or claimed to have information that 
did not fall within the area of jury notice, not that this information 
must stand up to any particular test of reliability.  The same is true of 
the language about “assisting” the trier to determine a fact in issue.  
This clause, as I see it, also is simply an affirmation of the distinction 
between what may come in at trial and the information jurors already 
have.  This was made pretty clear by the Advisory Committee’s 
quotation, in its Note to Rule 702, of Professor Ladd’s article in which 
he stated: 
There is no more certain test for determining when experts may 
be used than the common sense inquiry whether the untrained 
layman would be qualified to determine intelligently and to the 
best possible degree the particular issue without enlightenment 
from those having a specialized understanding of the subject 
involved in the dispute.11 
 
In this statement, Professor Ladd emphasized not the correctness of 
the expert’s testimony, but the limits of the jurors’ knowledge. 
 
States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197 (1980). 
 9 FED. R. EVID. 702 [hereinafter Rule 702 or 702]. 
 10 See MCCORMICK, supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 11 Mason Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV. 414, 418 (1952). 
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The Court in Daubert seized upon the word “science” in Rule 702 
and based its holding upon what it thought to be a correct reading of 
that term.  In this, I believe, the Court made a fundamental error, 
treating the case before it as one presenting a narrow question of 
textual analysis, rather than seeing it as raising for discussion the 
broad purposes of the law of Evidence in the light of its history and 
the value of jury trial.12  There is no reason to think that the word 
“science” was put into 702 other than as a convenient though vague 
reference to a subclass of cases within the broad class of cases 
involving specialized knowledge, specialized in the sense that it is not 
already possessed by a proportion of the population of substantial 
size.  The way was paved for this mistake by Frye’s use of the category 
“scientific evidence,” and its attaching specific consequences to that 
category in regard to admissibility.  In Daubert, the Supreme Court 
adopted and confirmed the legal category “science,” and then went 
on to attach different consequences than had Frye.  There was 
uncertainty following the Daubert decision as to whether it had made 
it more or less difficult for expert testimony to gain admission, a 
harbinger of the confusion that now surrounds the whole subject of 
the admissibility of expert testimony. 
Seizing upon the word “scientific” in 702, as just said, the Court 
in Daubert then went on to determine that to be “science,” evidence 
had to be “scientifically valid” or “good science,” and that this sort of 
science could only be the result of the “scientific method.”  The truth 
is that among people who consider themselves in some sense 
scientists, there is no clear understanding or agreement about what is 
meant by “science,” “good science” or “the scientific method.”  
Furthermore scientists who might be willing to give an account of 
how they go about their work, would probably disclaim responsibility 
for attaching any great significance to their account beyond its 
justifying the decisions they make regarding further research.  By 
contrast, there are people sometimes referred to as philosophers of 
science.  These people do talk about the scientific method and 
scientific validity.  Some of them are cited in the Daubert opinion—
Karl Popper most notably.13  It is not at all certain, however, that the 
Court understood these writers correctly, or even if it did, why legal 
consequences should be attached to their ideas.  Even if the Court is 
correct in Daubert about what is science, what is the scientific method, 
 
 12 See JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE 
COMMON LAW 2 (1898) (referring to “the deep political significance of the jury and 
its relation to what is most valued in the national history and traditions of the English 
race”). 
 13 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593. 
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and what is scientific validity, the chief flaw in the Court’s opinion is 
its failure to connect its analysis of these matters to any policy of the 
law of Evidence.  This failure originates in its threshold mistake of 
treating the case as presenting a narrow problem in textual 
interpretation.  If the result of Daubert is to require that scientific 
evidence, to be admissible, must be not merely relevant, but 
reliable—that is to say, have a certain probative value—Daubert gave 
no reason for this requirement other than that unless evidence has 
this probative value, it is not really science or scientifically valid. 
What were the forces at work that led to the Daubert decision?  In 
the first place, one must mention the powerful economic interests 
that saw themselves under threat from large jury awards arguably 
traceable to the admission of evidence of a causal connection 
between their products and injuries.  Writers and lawyers in the 
service of these interests launched a campaign to attack the purveyors 
of this evidence.  In particular they initiated a campaign of 
sloganeering, employing such labels as “junk science” or “faux 
science” or “bad science,”14 aimed at casting scorn on those who 
testified to opinions thought to warrant these labels.  It is 
embarrassing to concede that this kind of sloganeering may have 
influenced the course of the law. 
Another factor contributing to the Daubert decision was the 
desire of some judges to be associated with science, if not as full 
insiders, at least as knowledgeable associate members.  Their desire 
was to connect themselves with the most prestigious form of 
knowledge in our contemporary world: scientific knowledge.  Even if 
one does not practice science or the philosophy of science, to know 
what scientists do, and to be seen to know it, enhances self-esteem 
and status in our society.  Even when this knowledge is of a fairly 
primitive sort, as it usually is for judges, lawyers, law clerks, and law 
professors, generally being based on college courses and popular 
books on science, its possession places a person above the common 
run.  But here we can truly say, as the old adage has it, that a little 
knowledge is a dangerous thing.  In this case, it led the Court away 
from the sufficiently difficult job of discerning and implementing the 
purposes of the law of Evidence, into an attempt to shine with the 
reflected glory of science, in the light from a star only half 
understood, and which in any case had its own purposes quite 
unrelated to law. 
 
 14 Consider Professor Allen’s continued use of the term “junk science” in his 
contribution to this Symposium.  See generally Ronald J. Allen, Expertise and the Supreme 
Court: What is the Problem?, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 1 (2003). 
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Not to be left out of account as a factor contributing to Daubert is 
the anger and scorn that elite scientists feel toward what they 
consider bad science.  They persuade themselves, or have been 
persuaded by interested lawyers, that persons who represent 
themselves to be scientists and claim to know something about which 
they, the elite scientists, know much more, in being allowed to testify 
in courts of law are damaging the reputation of science and 
undermining its mission.  They are persuaded that if “junk science” is 
allowed in courts, this somehow will adversely affect the standards for 
academic appointments in science, government funding of scientific 
research, and other important matters.  There is no reason to think 
there is any connection whatever between these matters and the 
standards for the admission of evidence in courts, but elite scientists, 
who think little about the purposes of law, believe there is, and their 
disapproval of courts’ listening to inferior scientists has been skillfully 
communicated to judges, who, as already stated, aspire themselves to 
be approved by elite scientists. 
Finally, also to be taken into account as a factor contributing to 
Daubert is an ideology, far from decisively eliminated in our political 
debates, which cannot see the sense in entrusting to twelve persons 
picked at random from the general population important and 
difficult questions of fact.  Reservations coming from this perfectly 
reasonable political philosophy find place in the bosoms of some 
judges.  They reveal themselves in the Daubert opinion’s conflicting 
passages that on the one hand praise the ability of the jury to answer 
difficult questions and on the other hand question it.15  But in this 
debate, the Constitution has taken one side. 
As already indicated, there does not exist outside the law any 
settled meaning for the terms “science” or the “scientific method.”  If 
there were such a settled meaning, it still would have to be explained 
how the purposes of the law will be achieved by carrying that 
meaning over into a legal context and attaching to it the particular 
consequence of admissibility.  What is the precise shape of the legal 
idea “science” that Daubert created?  We do not know.  The Court says 
in its opinion that that case was presented to it as one involving 
scientific evidence, and that since it was so presented, the evidence 
must satisfy certain requirements.16  It did not need to decide, the 
Court stated, whether these requirements or others would apply in 
the case of nonscientific evidence.  Of course, in avoiding telling us 
what is scientific evidence, the Court failed to root its requirement 
 
 15 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595-96. 
 16 Id. at 590 n.8. 
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that scientific evidence be more than relevant in any understanding 
of the phenomenon of “science” that gave rise to the requirement in 
the first place. 
Daubert tells us that if evidence is scientific, it must have a certain 
probative value to be admissible.  This is simply because it is scientific 
or is claimed to be.  This is what all the talk about “scientific validity” 
and reliability comes down to—the requirement of a certain 
probative value.  The idea is no different from that contained in 403.  
Under 403, however, the reason for requiring a certain probative 
value before evidence is admitted is the risk of the occurrence of the 
specific evils already mentioned: the jury will ignore the substantive 
law, the jury will disregard the burden of proof, the jury will be swept 
away by emotion, and so forth.  These evils can be seen as such and 
taken into account through the exclusion of evidence without 
attacking the very reason for having jury trial: that the verdict may 
reflect beliefs about the world held by ordinary people and the 
working of average intelligences.  To require that “scientific 
evidence” be excluded unless it has a certain probative value simply 
because it is scientific, does not rest upon apprehension of any of the 
evils listed in 403, but directly attacks the fundamental reasons for 
jury trial. 
Daubert based its requirement that the evidence there involved 
be reliable on the fact that it was scientific, but did not explain the 
distinction between science and nonscience, nor draw from such a 
distinction reasons for a particular requirement in the case of 
scientific evidence.  In Kumho,17 the distinction between the scientific 
and the nonscientific was found to be unmaintainable and 
disappeared, and with its disappearance there also disappeared the 
reason given in Daubert for a requirement of reliability.  In these 
circumstances, the alternatives were to reconsider Daubert and see 
whether it was possible to come up with a rationale for requiring 
reliability other than the one based upon the mere fact that evidence 
was scientific, and if this effort failed, to abandon the result in Daubert 
and allow evidence in simply if relevant, or to extend the 
requirement of Daubert to all expert testimony.  The latter course was 
taken and it was taken, furthermore, without justification offered.  
The result in Daubert was assumed to justify imposing the reliability 
requirement on evidence of the sort presented in Kumho.  This is the 
embarrassing episode referred to in the title to this article.  Such a 
finesse probably would not have been possible if Kumho had come 
before Daubert. 
 
 17 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
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If Kumho is accepted, then all expert testimony must have a 
certain probative value to be admitted: relevance is not enough.  The 
collapse of the distinction between science and nonscience has led to 
this extension to all expertness.  But the distinction between expert 
and nonexpert evidence itself is vulnerable and subject to collapse, 
and if this distinction goes and the Court responds in the same way it 
did to the collapse of the science/nonscience distinction, then what 
we face is the extension of a reliability requirement to all evidence.  
Some commentators may attempt to ward off this outcome by 
invoking a distinction between fact and opinion witnesses.  They will 
say that Kumho, of course, should not be extended to “fact witnesses.”  
But all witnesses are fact witnesses in that they seek to inform the jury 
about the facts of the world, even if in some cases they are allowed to 
do so by the use of opinions and inferences. 
The distinction earlier referred to between information that may 
come through the informal process of jury notice—possibly because 
the information is possessed by a group of substantial size in the 
community—and information that may be introduced into evidence 
at trial, a distinction implicit in the idea of relevance in Rule 401,18 
policed by Rule 701, and affirmed in Rule 702, and which indeed is 
fundamental in our procedure, has nothing to do with any distinction 
between expert and nonexpert evidence.  In the argument over 
whether there is an intelligible distinction between expert and 
nonexpert evidence, all the evidence spoken of is assumed to come 
properly through the formal process. 
Most people agree that if the expert/nonexpert distinction 
breaks down with the consequence that all evidence to be admissible 
must have a certain probative value, there will be a grave impairment 
of jury trial.  This is especially so if probative value is to be judged in 
the light of background beliefs other than those that may be ascribed 
to reasonable jurors.  In Daubert, the Court indirectly suggested that 
an exclusionary rule such as the hearsay rule and the requirement 
that witnesses be competent support its suggestion that imposing a 
requirement of reliability on the admission of evidence is not unusual 
in the law of Evidence.19  But in the case of the familiar exclusionary 
rules, as in the case of Rule 403, a requirement of a certain probative 
value or even a flat rule of exclusion is a response to a particular 
danger, not a direct challenge to the main point of jury trial. 
Propelling some along this path step by step to the final 
conclusion that all evidence must be reliable to be admissible, not 
 
 18 FED. R. EVID. 401. 
 19 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.9. 
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stopping to ask whether the first step was a mistake, is the underlying 
belief, earlier referred to, that poorly educated, average citizens do 
not contribute much to fair adjudication, but instead return verdicts 
that often are inaccurate, and that whatever political advantages may 
accrue from jury trials, they do not justify the continuance of this 
state of affairs.  As has been frequently observed, statements that 
jurors render inaccurate verdicts are not supported by much 
empirical evidence.20  In the first place, to state that a verdict is 
incorrect implies a source of undoubted knowledge of the truth, 
when often there is no such unquestionable source.  Furthermore, 
even if it is the case, as it surely is, that mistaken verdicts have been 
returned, there is no warrant for believing that another tribunal 
would not have made the same mistakes: a judge is as likely to be 
misled by a claimed eyewitness as a jury. 
Sometimes an interest in displacing the jury is attempted to be 
masked by a suggestion that all that is sought by an admissibility 
requirement of reliability is to aid the jury in discharging its function 
in the best possible manner.  Assistance takes the shape of excluding 
evidence concededly relevant unless it comes in a form that permits 
the jury to be properly educated, so that its verdict will be the fruit of 
rational analysis.  If the evidence must be capable of bringing the jury 
to a certain level of understanding, to what level?  Surely it cannot be 
suggested that they must be brought to the same level as the expert 
witness himself.  It seems clear—indeed Professor Allen concedes as 
much in his contribution to the present symposium—that the 
insistence on the educational power of evidence is in the service of 
producing more accurate verdicts: “Does the expert in fact possess 
knowledge useful to this trial that is being brought to bear upon it in 
a way that increases the probability of accurate outcomes?”21  Thus, 
although Kumho’s requirement that expert evidence be reliable and 
the insistence that evidence have a certain educational power may be 
distinguishable on the surface, beneath they derive from the same 
conviction that jury verdicts are not as accurate as other forms of 
adjudication and that there are no good policy reasons why an 
inferior form of fact-finding should be accepted. 
Defects in our procedural system that produce inaccurate 
judgments are, of course, a matter of serious concern.  It should not 
be assumed, however, that inaccuracies result from the use of juries, 
rather than being attributable to some other aspect of the system.  
 
 20 See John H. Mansfield, Scientific Evidence Under Daubert, 28 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1, 23 
(1996). 
 21 Allen, supra note 14, at 7. 
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Thus, the proper functioning of the adversarial system may be 
impaired in certain situations—in many criminal prosecutions, for 
example—by an inequality of resources or a difference in lawyers’ 
abilities.  It may be possible directly to address these inequalities.  If 
this is not possible, in certain situations an exclusionary rule that 
addresses a specific malfunctioning of the adversary system may be 
appropriate.  The special exclusionary rules relating to lineup 
evidence are an example.  But such rules operate to protect one side 
against the superior power of the other, and are not across-the-board 
exclusionary rules of the sort established by Daubert-Kumho, where the 
rule excludes expert evidence unless it is shown to have a certain 
probative value. 
It is difficult to predict the future.  It is impossible to imagine 
that the Court will dismantle the Daubert-Kumho regime and return to 
the regime of easy admissibility that existed before Daubert, at least 
when “novel scientific evidence” was not involved.  There seems little 
possibility of legislative intervention or of any remedial proposal 
coming from the Advisory Committee, especially since it has only 
recently sponsored an amendment of Rule 702 that brings it into 
express accord with Daubert. 
As efforts by lower courts to apply Daubert continue, if confusion 
about its meaning persists and conflicts among the circuits develop, 
an appreciation of the need for some kind of adjustment may grow.  
Confusion and conflict may increase as a result of the extension of 
the reliability requirement to all expert evidence.  Conflict among 
the circuits will develop because some courts of appeal, in an effort to 
give some structure and semblance of law to rulings on admissibility, 
will attempt to spell out the “factors” that a trial judge must consider 
in ruling on admissibility, and perhaps even pursue the hopeless 
effort to distinguish expert method from expert conclusion, applying 
the Daubert-Kumho requirement only to the former.  Other courts will 
routinely uphold the exercise of discretion by the trial court, 
whichever way it went on the question of reliability.  In those circuits 
in which the latter approach is taken, a high degree of inconsistency 
among trial court rulings on the admissibility of expert evidence will 
become apparent. 
Inconsistency in results is, of course, a state of affairs we 
frequently accept for practical reasons and because of competing 
values.  If the same evidence had been put before a different trier of 
fact, whether judge or jury, the result might well have been different.  
Inconsistency in rulings on the admissibility of evidence, the 
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supposed application of law by the judge, is harder to accept. 22  
Nevertheless we do accept it to a degree in the case of rulings under 
Rule 403.  The Frye rule probably did function to give a certain 
measure of consistency and predictability to rulings on the 
admissibility of the sort of evidence it addressed—novel scientific 
evidence.  The pre-Daubert approach to other expert evidence also 
produced a considerable consistency in rulings on admissibility, since 
most proffered expert testimony was admitted, at least if the witness 
was deemed qualified.  In any case, inconsistency among rulings on 
the admissibility of expert evidence is not likely to produce remedial 
action unless it is accompanied by an increased realization of the 




 22  Inconsistency in the substantive standards for assessing expert 
testimony is troublesome: it means that similarly situated litigants are 
treated differently based on where they litigate, and it promotes forum 
shopping.  Moreover, apparently arbitrary differences among courts 
evaluating similar testimony weaken the justification for removing 
reliability determinations from the jury in the first place. 
Note, Reliable Evaluation of Expert Testimony, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2142, 2147 (2003) 
(footnote omitted). 
